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Abstract
This research applies statistical methods in pattern recognition to test the privacy capabil-
ities of a very popular anonymity tool used on the Internet known as Tor.
Using a recently developed algorithm known as Causal State Splitting and Reconstruction
(CSSR), we can create hidden Markov models of network processes proxied through Tor. In con-
trast to other techniques, our CSSR extensions create a minimum entropy model without any prior
knowledge of the underlying state structure. The inter-packet time delays of the network process,
preserved by Tor, can be symbolized into ranges and used to construct the models.
After the construction of training models, detection is performed using Confidence Intervals.
New test data can be fed through a model to determine the intervals and estimate how well the
data matches the model. If a match is found, the state sequence, or path, can be used to uniquely
describe the data with respect to the model. It is by comparing these paths that Tor users can be
identified.
Packet data from any two computers using the Tor network can be matched to a model
and their state sequences can be compared to give a statistical likelihood that the two systems are
actually communicating together over Tor. We perform experiments on a private Tor network to
validate this. Results showed that communicating systems could be identified with a 95% accuracy
in our test scenario.
This attack differs from previous maximum likelihood-based approaches in that it can be
performed between just two computers using Tor. The adversary does not need to be a global
observer. The attack can also be performed in real-time provided that a matching model had
already been constructed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Signals intelligence, commonly referred to as SIGINT, is a widely encompassing intelligence
gathering field involving the analysis of transmitted signals for access to private information [1]. Tra-
ditionally only a military discipline, the importance of the field is well understood within the defense
community [2]. More recently however, with the proliferation of large communication networks used
by the public (such as the Internet, cellular networks, or wireless for other mobile devices), SIGINT
and SIGINT countermeasures have become a more general concern.
With examples visible throughout military history [3, 4], the importance of SIGINT has only
been fully recognized since World War II. During the war, mathematicians and other cryptography
analysts collaborated to break enemy codes, providing valuable information to field commanders [5].
Cryptanalysis has since become a very important component of the SIGINT field.
But what happened when codes could not be decrypted? Out of necessity, analysts quickly
found that other information could be extracted from the electronic signals. In an early example,
they found that radio operators could be uniquely identified by the way they typed Morse code [4].
And during World War II, even though the Americans were unable to decipher Japanese naval code
during the Guadalcanal campaign, they were able to successfully rely on other information derived
from their signals. Volume, source, and patterns in the signal traffic provided valuable intelligence
to naval commanders [5].
The process of extracting high level information from communications even when the actual
message data cannot be read is known as traffic analysis. The importance of traffic analysis has
grown and expanded along with the SIGINT field. Increasing reliance on more open communication
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networks has only accelerated the growth of the field’s importance. In particular, the Internet
provides a variety of opportunities for traffic analysis.
1.1 Traffic Analysis
When sensitive information is transmitted through the Internet, it is typically encrypted
in order to prevent others from being able to view it. This process obscures the sensitive data
residing within the packet, leaving only ciphertext visible to a potential adversary. Assuming that
the encryption is strong, meaning that the keys cannot be guessed within a very long amount of
time, no one should be able to view the protected data as it traverses the Internet.
But even if the data is successfully hidden, will the sender be able to maintain a full ex-
pectation of privacy? Unfortunately, it is not that easy. For successful communication, important
routing information must be left unencrypted. The packet headers, timing, and size leave a great
deal of high-level information available to possible attackers, even for encrypted protocols like Secure
Shell (SSH).
Figure 1.1 shows the contents of a single packet captured during an encrypted SSH session
using the popular capturing tool Wireshark. Even though the sensitive data has been encrypted,
a variety of information is still readily available to a potential adversary. Information that can be
deduced from this example includes:
• Who is talking (the source)
• To whom they are talking (the destination)
• What application-layer protocols are in use (SSH, HTTPS, etc.)
• The amount of data contained within each packet
• Packet timings
Each of these pieces of information, especially when combined with similar information from
other packets in a flow or stream, can be very revealing about the data within an encrypted message.
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Figure 1.1: Packet captured from an encrypted SSH session
1.1.1 Important Traffic Analysis Attacks
What follows are some examples of traffic analysis attacks on encrypted protocols. Re-
searchers used the attacks to infer information that would jeopardize the security of the communi-
cations.
Song et al. created profiles of users’ typing characteristics and used them to guess which
keys were being typed in an interactive SSH session [6]. Since SSH immediately transmits each key
press in its own separate packet across the network, they were able to measure the delays between
packets and match that to pre-determined delays for certain key pair combinations. Prediction of the
key sequences was done using hidden Markov models. The attack was used to drastically enhance
the probability of breaking a password that was entered over SSH, while simultaneously reducing
the time required to do so.
Hintz found that unique signatures could be created for various HTTPS websites based on
the resources they load (e.g. HTML, images, CSS, and JavaScript content). If a catalog of SSL-
enabled websites could be accessed and profiled beforehand, the timing signatures could be used
to detect which websites were being accessed through an encrypting web proxy [7]. A more robust
variant of this attack was described by Bissias et al. [8] and was further refined by Liberatore and
Levine [9]. Most recently, Herrmann et al. integrated new fingerprinting techniques and generalized
the attack to a broader variety of systems [10].
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An attack by Wright et al. exploited an encoding scheme used in Voice over IP (VoIP) to
identify the language being spoken in encrypted conversations [11]. The attack was shown to be
successful when a variable bit-rate encoder was used and was tested on conversations between over
two thousand native speakers in 21 different languages. They continued to explore how the privacy
of VoIP users could be further compromised by using hidden Markov models to predict when certain
phrases were used during the call [12].
On a more closely related note, Wright et al. also explored the topic of protocol identification
in encrypted tunnels. They devised a new traffic analysis technique to classify encrypted network
traffic based on which protocol, or set of protocols, were in use within a connection stream [13].
We use a similar approach, which also uses hidden Markov models, to label network traffic by its
underlying protocol.
For further reading on traffic analysis attacks and anonymity on the Internet, see [4, 14].
1.2 Anonymity Systems
In response to such successful traffic analysis attacks, many tools and systems have been
developed with the goal of enhancing security and privacy over the Internet. These tools go far
beyond simply encrypting the transmitted data. Chaum first proposed the idea of creating a system
that would mix traffic with other connections in order to provide a level of anonymity [15]. Today’s
systems employ a wide number of techniques, such as:
• Proxying connections through any number of systems around the world
• Mixing and reordering packet flows
• Controlling packet flow rates with timers and other batching strategies
• Padding packet sizes to a fixed length
• Sending fake cover traffic
Proxying the connections is done by most if not all anonymity systems in order to hide the
source from the destination. Different systems employ various combinations of the other techniques
in order to make it difficult, or in the best case impossible, to trace and analyze the traffic. In
particular, techniques that modify the timing of packet flows have the greatest effect on a system.
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Based on the use of these timing techniques, there are two classes of systems: high-latency and
low-latency.
High-latency systems like Mixmaster [16] and Mixminion [17] are much better at hindering
attacks based on timings. The reordering, mixing, and batching strategies they perform limit what
can be gained by performing traffic analysis on the packet delays [18]. While very effective from
an anonymity perspective, these systems are not as widely used due to the impracticality of time
constraints. When accessing web sites, or typing keys into an SSH session, users do not want to deal
with a very large time delay. Responses from the other system are desired as quickly as possible,
which the timing strategies prohibit.
Low-latency systems like Tor [19], Java Anon Proxy (also known JAP or JonDo) [20], and
Invisible Internet Protocol (I2P) [21] do not disrupt the timing of the packets as they propagate the
network. This method is better suited for commonly used protocols like HTTP for web browsing and
interactive protocols like SSH. We use Tor for our experiments since it is one of the more popular
low-latency anonymity systems in use today. Chapter 2 will describe how Tor works in further detail.
1.3 Research Questions
Recent advancements with pattern recognition tools [22, 23, 24] provide the basis for this
research. We ask: can we apply these tools to a data sequence generated from a network capture
and achieve a model of the underlying process? In particular, can this be done when the process is
streamed over Tor? Since Tor does not make any specific efforts to reorder the packets in a flow or
introduce extra latencies, we hypothesize that this should be possible.
These tools [24] will allow us to test the confidence of the models we generate. We can also
match new sequences of data to those models (or reject them all if none are a statistically significant
match) [22, 24]. The application of these processes should give us an ability similar to that of Wright
et al. [13] where we can classify a sequence of traffic, about which we know nothing, based on its
underlying protocol. We propose that our methods will be an improvement because we can use our
tools to show when we have collected enough training data and also to determine how well a new
set of data matches up against a library of models. The latter can be achieved through the use of
models with confidence intervals rather than the maximum likelihood approach.
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We would like to take the detection a step further and see if it is possible to use our models
to follow the path taken through the Tor network. Previous work done in this area uses temporal or
frequency domain-based correlation to match input flows to output flows [25, 26]. We ask: if tracing
the model paths is successful, how will it compare to these previous techniques?
Finally, can we develop and apply a well-defined process to construct models, match proto-
cols, and perform path detection? If so, what degree of traffic analysis capabilities will this give us
on Tor connections?
1.4 Organization
Previous sections of Chapter 1 outlined the motivation behind this work. The rapidly
growing field of traffic analysis was surveyed and we demonstrated its importance as a field of study.
The effectiveness of traffic analysis furthered the need for additional privacy, which led to the creation
of a variety of anonymity systems. Also, we identified and described the primary questions we seek
to answer through this research.
Chapter 2 explains the relevant background behind the tools used in this research. Since we
use Tor as the anonymity system in our experiments, we take a deeper look at how it works and how
it is able to provide that additional level of privacy. The limitations of Tor, some inherent and some
by design, are discussed with the goal of creating a clearer understanding of the capabilities of Tor.
Tor’s popularity and widespread appeal has attracted a great deal of attention from researchers
interested in security and privacy. We explore their work and discuss what attacks have been
previously performed against Tor. We also provide some background on the pattern recognition
tools described in Section 1.3.
Chapter 3 describes the process we use to construct models from the data we capture and
how we test our confidence in them. We begin by looking at how to convert network traffic into data
sequences, keeping what information we feel provides the best balance of reliability and potential
for exploitation, the inter-packet time delays. The numerical data values must be symbolized for
use by the model construction algorithm, and tools are described for how to approach the problem.
Once the data has been symbolized, a model of the underlying process can be constructed. A
proof-of-concept is demonstrated for this process. Finally, the constructed models are tested for
how well they statistically represent the original process. We check to see if enough data was used
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in construction, and describe a method for pruning transitions out of the model that do not have
enough data to make them statistically significant. An example of this is provided as well.
Chapter 4 focuses on how we can perform protocol and path detection using the models we
generate. We show how to compute confidence intervals on the transitions of our models by running
data through them. An example of this process is shown, where confidence intervals are generated
for a model and are used for detection. We also show how the models can be used to perform path
detection through Tor and compare the approach to that of Zhu et al. [25, 26].
Chapter 5 describes our results from using these pattern recognition tools to perform traffic
analysis on a live Tor network. Our experiment utilizes the full range of processes from data capture
to model construction to path matching. This chapter describes from start to finish what is needed
to carry out our traffic analysis attack.
Chapter 6 summarizes the work, highlighting the conclusions we were able to draw from our
experiments. We also propose some interesting questions that would be good candidates for future
exploration.
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Chapter 2
Background
Tor [19] is one of the most popular anonymity systems in use today. As of April 2010, there
were almost 1800 relay servers on the public Tor network [27] and that number continues to grow.
Tor’s stability and deployment breadth can be attributed to its practical design, a product of the
large amount of privacy and usability research done by its designers [28, 29, 30, 31, 18, 19, 32, 33, 34].
Until more scalable peer-to-peer solutions like MorphMix [35], Tarzan [36], and Torsk [37] develop
from their fledgling experimental states into more stable, well-understood platforms, Tor is the
anonymity system with perhaps the best long-term viability. It is for this reason that we have
selected it for our traffic analysis research.
2.1 Tor
Tor is a low-latency anonymity system that operates as an overlay network on the Internet.
An overlay network is a smaller sub-network that has been built over a larger, and usually pre-
existing, network. Individual systems in the overlaid network communicate through virtual links
that are physically transmitted by the underlying network, but are encapsulated so that they stay
logically separated from regular traffic. Examples of this type of network would include a Virtual
Private Network (VPN) or a peer-to-peer network, with the Internet being the underlying network.
Tor primarily consists of computers running any number of three types of services: relay,
directory server, or client. Relays, also sometimes called nodes, routers, or onion routers, are the
backbone of the network. Relays transfer data from clients to other relays, between two relays, or
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retrieve external resources for a client. By default, relays listen on TCP port 9001 for incoming
requests. While they are active, they publish their status to a list of predefined directory servers.
Directory servers catalog the information they have about various relays and vote amongst each
other on which ones to list as running, valid, stable, etc. After the servers vote and all agree on a
list, they come to a consensus. The consensus is published on a TCP port (9030 by default) where
it can be downloaded by clients.
The client service sets up a listener for TCP streams that the user wishes to route through the
network. The listener is a SOCKS [38, 39] proxy that listens on port 9050 by default. Before packets
arrive to be proxied, the client initializes some circuits with the relays listed in the downloaded
consensus. To create a circuit, the client chooses a relay to be the first node in the new circuit and
sends it a creation request. Once created, the client uses the same circuit to extend out to a second
and then third node. This way, the client chooses and knows each node in the path its traffic will
take. Also, this gives the client the opportunity to set up symmetric key pairs with each node for
performing encryption. Building the circuit is analogous to extending a spyglass from the source to
the destination, with the end of each ring being a node of the circuit.
The flowchart in Figure 2.1 summarizes the process a Tor client follows to prepare for a
data transfer. Once the first piece of data for a new TCP stream arrives at the proxy, one of the
previously created circuits is selected for the transfer. If there are no circuits available, a new one is
created. Before any data is transferred, the destination of the packet is sent through the circuit to
the last node so that it can start the connection. This node is called the exit node since it is where
all of the packets will exit the Tor overlay and continue on to their final destination. The exit node
sends confirmation to the client once it has connected to the destination, allowing the data transfer
to begin.
As each data packet is ready to be sent, it is split or padded into cells of 512 bytes, which
are then iteratively encrypted using the key of each successive relay of the circuit. In other words,
the original packet is encrypted with the key for the last node, which is wrapped in another packet
and encrypted with the key for the second node, which is encapsulated again and encrypted with
the key for the first node. The result is similar in nature to an onion. As each relay in the circuit
receives the onion packet, it will decrypt and peel away a layer, forwarding on what remains.
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Figure 2.1: Preparation for data transfer
Figure 2.2 shows the onion packet being sent from the source, which we will call Alice, to
the first node in the circuit. The onion packet contains four layers at this point, and only the headers
of the outermost layer are visible. This is represented in the figure by the hash symbols where the
headers of the inner layers would be. This is to imply that they are encrypted within the payload
of this specific packet and cannot be read by anyone sniffing the line.
Once the packet is received by the first node, the old headers (or in the terms of our onion
analogy, the outermost layer) are stripped away. The payload is decrypted using the key that was
previously established with Alice, revealing the next hop of the circuit. This process is illustrated
by Figure 2.3. The relay then forwards the remainder of the onion packet to the next hop, which
is shown in Figure 2.4. Notice that this relay cannot determine that the packet originated from
Alice. It can only see the packet coming from the first node. Even after it goes through the same
unwrapping and decrypting process, it will also not be able to see the destination, Bob. It will only
see another onion packet that is to be relayed to the third node in the circuit.
After the third node unwraps the last layer of the onion packet, it has the original packet
from Alice. The packet is sent “as is” to Bob through the previously established connection (shown
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Figure 2.2: Onion packet entering Tor circuit
Figure 2.3: Outer layer of onion packet is peeled away and next layer is decrypted
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Figure 2.4: Remaining onion packet going to second Tor relay in circuit
Figure 2.5: Exit relay forwards original packet to destination
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in Figure 2.5). That is, if the packet was originally in cleartext, it is sent in cleartext. To achieve
encryption for this step of the circuit, Alice must have used a secure protocol like SSH or HTTPS. A
common misconception is that Tor always provides end-to-end encryption, but this is not the case.
This misconception has allowed people to use Tor for capturing usernames and passwords [40].
When the destination, Bob, replies to Alice’s request, the same process is followed in reverse
order. The response packets are successively wrapped in relay cells at each node in the circuit. Once
again, the cells are iteratively encrypted by each relay using the key set up for that circuit. When
Alice gets the response packet, her Tor client unwraps and decrypts each layer to return the original
packet from Bob up through the SOCKS proxy and back to the application she is using.
Obviously, there are many more details to the process, such as encryption schemes, integrity
checking, congestion handling, and path selection. For more in-depth information on those topics,
see the Tor specification [19]. Also, Murdoch and Watson provide another good overview and more
updated information about Tor’s path selection techniques. An alternative technique is suggested,
but it is found that Tor’s current method of weighting nodes by bandwidth is much better for
performance, while at the same time provides better security against botnets running Tor relays [41].
2.2 Attacks on Tor
We are not the first ones to focus our research on Tor. For the same reasons we outlined
earlier, many other researchers have examined the abilities of Tor to resist various forms of traf-
fic analysis. Some of these works led to successful attacks on anonymity and stimulated further
discussion on how to handle those situations.
Returning to the path selection analysis by Murdoch and Watson [41], a large amount of
compromised computers, “bots”, that were controlled by an adversary, a “bot herder”, could be used
to run a very extensive and diverse set of relays. With such a diverse set of relays, they could expect
to capture a broad sampling of the traffic going through Tor. Other work by Murdoch suggests an
adversary may only need 1 out of every 2000 packets to perform a successful timing attack [42]. This
could become a serious threat to privacy, and the best path selection strategy to prevent this was
found to be the one currently in place. Because bots are typically on low-bandwidth connections,
consistently choosing paths with higher available bandwidth would help users avoid botnet relays,
and reduce the incentive for bot herders to run them.
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At one time however, the path selection strategy was found to be worse for anonymity.
Bauer et al. found that the Tor directory servers did not do anything to verify the bandwidth
claims reported by a relay [43]. By modifying the relay code to falsely report a large amount of
bandwidth, an attacker could attract a large amount of connections to themselves and gain a higher
probability of seeing each circuit. The path selection technique was kept, but mitigations were made
to keep low-bandwidth relays from abusing it, such as integrating reputation into the directory server
consensus.
Murdoch and Danezis performed traffic analysis on the Tor network using a timing-based
congestion attack [44]. The attack required an adversary to create a single hop circuit with a relay
in the global Tor network and flood it with data. Then whenever the timing slowed, assuming it
was due to the relay and not the link, one could guess that the relay was processing data in a
circuit. If enough relays were observed using this technique, slow downs in the flows would line up
and show the attacker which three relays were being used in a circuit. This attack was devised and
orchestrated very early in Tor’s history when there were only 13 nodes on the entire network. Newer
research suggests however, that with a much larger Tor network and heavier traffic that the attack
is no longer possible [45].
Hopper et al. compiled catalogs of round trip times and used them with a malicious web
server to limit the degree of Tor’s anonymity [46]. To collect round trip times for comparison, the
attacker must connect to servers on various subnets around the Internet and compile a latency map
to those subnets. Then, if a user could be directed to the malicious web server, they could measure
how long the packets took to go round trip to the client. The client’s round trip time could be
compared to the round trip times on the latency map and a reasonable estimate could be made of
2 to 4 subnets in which the client likely resides.
Zhu et al. used temporal and frequency domain-based correlation of a network’s entrance
and exit times to attack the anonymity of mix networks like Tor [25, 26]. Using just the captured
packet times, streams from the source flowing into the mix or network of mixes are matched to
streams flowing out by a maximum likelihood method. This attack requires the global observation
of all entrances and exits from the network.
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2.3 Pattern Recognition Tools
For our attack on Tor, we use various techniques described by Schwier [24]. In his work,
Schwier further develops an algorithm to generate hidden Markov models, or HMMs, from a time
series and provides new tools for effective pattern detection using the HMMs and a test sequence.
We now provide some background on those tools. Our notation should be consistent with that of
Schwier’s.
2.3.1 Zero-Knowledge CSSR
The Causal State Splitting and Reconstruction, or CSSR, algorithm can be used to generate
HMMs from discrete sequences of data without having to make any prior assumptions about the
model structure. The algorithm was first proposed by Shalizi and Crutchfield [47, 48] and was further
refined in their later works [49, 50]. The algorithm determines the underlying state structure, called
the causal states, and the transition probabilities of the process representing the input data with
the least amount of uncertainty. See Figure 2.6 for an example result model.
Figure 2.6: Example of a hidden Markov model created using CSSR
The original algorithm by Shalizi and Crutchfield required only the data sequence from
which to construct the model and a maximum string length parameter, L. The first step of the
algorithm involves splitting the data sequence into smaller subsequences of incrementally increasing
lengths, and this parameter tells it when to stop.
Their implementation made two important assumptions: that one knew the best value
of L to use and that there was more than enough data in the input sequence. However, these
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assumptions do not always hold when dealing with realistic situations like data captured from an
unknown computer network process. This is where the work of Schwier et al. [24, 23] applies.
To resolve the first assumption, an algorithm was developed to find the best value of L to
use. CSSR is run with incrementally increasing values of L, starting at L = 2. After CSSR generates
the model for that value of L, the original data is traced through the model and the sequence of
states it takes is recorded. The state sequences are compared for each Ln and Ln−1. When two are
found that match, the state structure is assumed to have stabilized and the previous value of L is
said to be the best value to use.
Using CSSR and the process for determining L, an HMM of a process can be created from
a sequence of observations without any knowledge of parameters a priori.
2.3.2 Model Confidence
The second assumption Shalizi made was that there was always more than enough data in
the input sequence. This is how he reasoned that the generated model would be the model that
most optimally represented the underlying process. By always using enough data, CSSR sees all
possible transition events of the underlying process and properly represents them all in the model
it creates.
However, we will only ever have finite amounts of data, which may or may not include all
possible events the process will take. This is especially true in our application. We need a way to
be statistically confident that certain unexpected events will not occur within a given probability.
Schwier uses the z-test to calculate a metric of statistical confidence. The z-test reports how much
data is needed to have confidently captured enough low-probability events. It also finds how much
confidence there is in the generated model in cases where not enough data was used.
In those cases when the test finds that an insufficient amount of data was used, it is because
low-probability events were visible but there are not enough of them to be confident in conditions
under which they occur. In these cases, CSSR includes states and transitions in the generated
models without being confident in the underlying conditional probabilities for those events. Schwier
also provides a method to prune these unsubstantiated states and transitions from the model by
thresholding the asymptotic state probabilities. More information about this process is provided in
Section 3.6.1.
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2.3.3 Confidence Intervals
Traditionally, new incoming data is matched to a model using the Forward-Backward pro-
cedure [51]. The forward part of the procedure uses maximum likelihood to find the best match out
of a set of models, and the backward part tunes the model parameters to the data.
The use of confidence intervals provides an alternative method for matching data to a
model [22]. Confidence intervals are calculated for each transition probability in an HMM. This is
done by running the test data through the model and counting the frequency that a transition is
taken out of the total number of times the model had the opportunity to take it.
The confidence interval method has a few advantages over the maximum likelihood approach
for our application. Most notably, we are not forced to choose a winner out of a set of models
when using confidence intervals. While maximum likelihood simply selects the model with the least
amount of difference from the data, confidence intervals provide a metric for describing how similar
each model is to the data. If none of them are within a specified threshold, called the rejection rate,
we can reject them all and say that the data does not match any of the protocols we have modeled.
Another more intuitively appealing aspect of the confidence interval approach is how in-
creasing amounts of data are handled. When the first few samples have been used, the intervals
are very wide, having a high degree of variance. As more data samples are used for detection, the
intervals tighten up around the transition probability due to lower variance.
Also, the number of multiplications is constant for any amount of data samples. This differs
from maximum likelihood, where the number of multiplications is linear with respect to the amount
of data samples. This presents a problem because each multiplication is always by a probability—
a floating point number between 0 and 1. This makes the result get smaller and smaller as it
asymptotically approaches zero. One way to mitigate this is to normalize all the values after each
step by scaling them. However, this is a poor solution for computer implementations because the
additional multiplication operations cause more floating point error to accumulate in the result [52].
The results of Schwier et al. found that the desired false negative rate could be calculated
when using confidence intervals, but the false positive rate could not. Receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) curves were used to find the best parameters in each situation. In general, both the
true positive and false positive rates would be higher for detection with confidence intervals, but
there would be a lower false negative rate. Maximum likelihood would have a lower false positive
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rate [22, 24]. In this sense, confidence intervals are better suited for identification, while maximum
likelihood is better for classification.
2.3.4 Window Sizes
The final problem examined by Schwier was how to determine the best window size to use
when matching data. Typically, our data sequences will be split into much smaller subsequences, or
windows, when being used for detection. This is done to allow us to tell which model best matches
the data at various points in time during the sequence. For instance, protocol A may be running for
the first few minutes of a test capture and then the system might switch to protocol B for the next
few minutes, and then on to protocol C. If we run the entire test set through the detection routine,
we will just see a match to one of them (or possibly none of them if confidence intervals are used).
By windowing the data, we get a better feel of which process is running at different times.
Optimally windowing a data set is a very complicated task requiring the user to make trade-
offs. If the window size is too small, there may not be enough data to make a statistically confident
decision about which process is the best match. The confidence intervals will be too large with too
much variance, enabling multiple models to have high acceptance rates.
If the window size is too large, it will take longer to recognize a change in the underlying
process. Once the change occurs, newer data will have to fill up more than half of the window to
statistically overpower the old data in the window. It is only after this point that the new underlying
process could be recognized.
The methods by Schwier [24] determine a good window size to use for comparing data to
a pair of models. The resulting size should be no greater than the minimum necessary to tell the
difference between sequences from the two models. Any larger and we would waste time in spotting
changes between the two behaviors. The minimum necessary value is found by analyzing binomial
distributions of two transitions to determine the likelihood of making a decision error.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter we described Tor and presented our reasoning for using it in our experiments.
The net effect of using Tor was that websites or other things you use on the Internet will not know
who you are. The level of privacy provided extends so that no one single point in a circuit knows
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both the source and the destination. Our reason for using it was its popularity and large amount of
active research. This research has yielded viable attacks on the anonymity guarantee that Tor tries
to provide, and the results of those attacks were described.
We also introduced the pattern recognition tools used in this research and highlighted some
details that are relevant to this work. These tools provide the capability to generate models of
a process by observing a sequence of its outputs. The CSSR algorithm has been proven to find
the set of states for a model that best represent the underlying process when given enough data.
We described a tool that can be used to test whether we have used enough data, and another one
to prune the models we generate of any transitions that are not statistically significant. We also
examined a way to detect whether a new sequence of data was a statistical match to a model through
the use of confidence intervals.
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Chapter 3
Model Construction
In order to run our attack on Tor, we need to create training models to use in our matching
process. For any connections that we try to match up, we must first have a valid hidden Markov
model that represents the protocol in use. To do this, we must collect training data from a Tor
connection where we know the protocol being used. Then, a specific process is followed to create a
good model from the data. This chapter describes that process in detail and discusses our results
from using it.
3.1 Process Overview
We follow the process described by the flowchart in Figure 3.1 to create the models required
by our attack. First, data is collected from a connection where we know the protocol that is in use.
This will be our training data. The model that is created from it can be used to detect that same
protocol in future connections we test.
After symbolizing the data we captured, the CSSR algorithm introduced in Section 2.3.1 is
used to create a model. We start with L = 2 and increase it as needed. To determine if an increase is
needed, we first apply the z-test described in Section 2.3.2 to make sure we used enough data. Once
it is established that enough data was used, the value for L is incremented if the state structure of
the model changed. Sometimes enough data (according to the z-test) cannot be captured. We also
discuss the reason for this and what can be done in order to still make use of the model.
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Figure 3.1: Flowchart summarizing the model construction process
3.2 Data Collection
For our experiments, all data collection is done on processes sent through Tor. Our experi-
ments use data captured in our private Tor network testbed. The network is made up of a collection
of systems all running Tor and our test protocols. For more information on how the network and
Tor were configured, see Appendix A.
The tshark [53] program is used to capture packets within the network. It is a command
line version of Wireshark and is usually included in the Wireshark package. tshark runs with less
overhead than its graphical counterpart. This allows more of the system’s memory to be used to
capture larger data sets. tshark was chosen over other command line capture tools, like tcpdump [54],
because it still provides access to the very versatile filtering rules in the full Wireshark.
For filtering, tshark is configured to only capture packets with a data length greater than
zero. This will throw out plain ACK packets, as we are only interested in the ones carrying data
from the protocol. These packets will make up our observations of the network process. In addition,
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we may filter for a certain port or IP address depending on what type of traffic we want to capture.
For outputting, tshark is configured to only record the time that each packet was received,
separated by newlines. The output value is a Unix timestamp (the number of seconds since midnight
on 1 January 1970) [55]. All other data about the packets (e.g. sequence numbers or lengths) is
ignored.
Below is an example of a tshark command to record packet times for all non-empty packets
going to a Tor SOCKS proxy:
tshark -i eth0 -n -l -o column.format:’" timestamps ","%t"’
-R "tcp.srcport ==9050 && tcp.len > 0"
3.3 Symbolization
Before any collected data can be used by our pattern recognition tools, it must be symbol-
ized. To do this, the difference between each successive packet time is computed and that value is
used by a lookup table to determine the appropriate symbol it should be given.
The time difference, ∆t, is calculated by subtracting the receive time of the previous packet
from the time of the current packet. In other words, ∆ti = ti − ti−1 where t is the receive time of
packet i. Obviously, the first packet in our data sequence will not have a value, so we just start
with i = 2. This step is done so that network latencies between the source and the destination are
filtered out. The data sequence we capture will look the same at either end of the connection.
Time each Delta at Time each Delta at
packet is sent, ti sender, ∆ti packet is received, ti receiver, ∆ti
1269407285.323450 N/A 1269407285.490769 N/A
1269407285.789346 0.466 1269407285.956495 0.466
1269407285.916296 0.127 1269407286.083583 0.127
1269407286.483149 0.567 1269407286.650283 0.567
1269407286.909037 0.426 1269407287.076253 0.426
1269407287.034984 0.126 1269407287.202075 0.126
Table 3.1: Deltas are used to ignore constant latencies
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Using deltas will allow us to ignore any constant latencies in the network connection. Notice
in Table 3.1 that there is a 167ms delay between the send time and receive times, but this does not
affect the delta values; they are the same for each packet. This technique works well for constant
latencies, but if the latency suddenly increases, it could cause a time sample to be incorrectly
symbolized. The extra delay could cause the sample to be grouped into a higher interval. Table 3.2
demonstrates this point. Extra latency after the fourth packet was sent causes it to be received later
and all of that extra latency carries over to the delta value.
Time each Delta at Time each Delta at
packet is sent, ti sender, ∆ti packet is received, ti receiver, ∆ti
1269407285.323450 N/A 1269407285.490769 N/A
1269407285.789346 0.466 1269407285.956495 0.466
1269407285.916296 0.127 1269407286.083583 0.127
1269407286.483149 0.567 1269407287.241283 1.158
1269407286.909037 0.426 1269407287.427253 0.186
1269407287.034984 0.126 1269407287.553253 0.126
Table 3.2: Deltas do not handle variable latencies
When working offline, a Perl script is used to parse the output from tshark and calculate
time deltas to 10−4 precision. If an incoming data sequence is being used for real-time detection,
we let that detection program calculate the time delta to the same precision.
Using the calculated values of ∆t, we symbolize the data by grouping it into ranges and
assigning anything in that range a unique symbol such as A or B. To do this, we must have a lookup
table such as Table 3.3. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the symbolization process on some sample data.
Symbol Range
A {0.000,0.300}
B {0.301,0.500}
C {0.501,1.000}
Table 3.3: Example lookup table
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Figure 3.2: The symbolization process
If we are generating a model from new training data, we will have to create a lookup table
for our new data. We derived our intervals by splitting the packets into distinct timing clusters.
We did this by plotting a histogram of the full data sequence and looking for local minima in the
discrete curve. In our process, we create the symbolization ranges by hand using this plot as a guide.
This step could be automated if a completely autonomous model construction process is required.
Figure 3.3 shows a histogram of SSH file transfer data captured over Tor. We split the
packet times into groups at the dotted lines. Again, these ranges were selected by hand. The x-axis
values of each of these lines make up the interval boundaries for the new lookup table.
Figure 3.3: Probability distribution of inter-packet time delays during an SSH file transfer
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3.4 CSSR
The input data is a discrete sequence of observations χ that are observed from some unknown
process, where χ = [χ1, χ2, . . . , χn]. In this case, n is the total number of observations in the data
sequence χ. The individual observations can be any symbol out of a finite alphabet A. To illustrate
this, assume an unknown process is generating a sequence of outputs. If we observe ten of these
outputs, our data sequence for CSSR might be
χ = [ A B A B A A B B A B ]
and the alphabet would be A = [A,B]. In practice the sequences will be much longer, containing
thousands or even millions of symbols.
CSSR works by splitting the sequence up into smaller subsequences and looking at the
probability of seeing a certain symbol after each different type of subsequence. The splitting is done
for incrementally increasing subsequence lengths, from zero up to a preset limit of L. That is, we
perform the split process for {i : 0 ≤ i ≤ L}. In our unknown process example, if we let L = 2, we
will split for i = 0, i = 1, and then i = 2. The sets of split subsequences would be
W1 = [ A B A B A A B B A B ] for i = 1
W2 = [ AB BA AB BA AA AB BB BA AB ] for i = 2
We do not show the case of i = 0 in the figure, because it is just a null set. Also note that there will
be n+ 1− i subsequences in each subsequence set Wi.
After the first step of i = 0, the model will have just one state. Additional states may be
added during the rest of the split steps 1 ≤ i ≤ L. A new state is added when the conditional
probability of a subsequence and its following symbol does not match that of any other state. These
conditional probabilities are calculated by counting the number of times a certain symbol follows
each subsequence in Wi.
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For example, at i = 1, the conditional probabilities for the set W1 would look like
Pr(A | A) =
1
5
Pr(B | A) =
4
5
Pr(A | B) =
3
4
Pr(B | B) =
1
4
At i = 2, the probabilities for set W2 will be
Pr(A | AA) =
0
1
Pr(A | BA) =
1
3
Pr(B | AA) =
1
1
Pr(B | BA) =
2
3
Pr(A | AB) =
2
3
Pr(A | BB) =
1
1
Pr(B | AB) =
1
3
Pr(B | BB) =
0
1
After determining the conditional probabilities for a step, the χ2 statistical test is used to
compare each probability to the ones from the previous step. If the test determines that it does not
match the probabilities for a state, a new one is created and the subsequence is added to the new
state’s history. For the full pseudocode, see [24].
Models created by our implementation of CSSR have two important properties that will
allow us to use them for detection purposes. Most notably, all models will:
• Have transient states removed
• Be deterministic
During construction, the algorithm removes any transient states that may arise. A transient
state is a state that cannot be reached again once the model has transitioned out of it. For example,
in the model in Figure 3.4, state S0 is a transient state and will be removed. We perform this step
because a model cannot be positive recurrent if it contains any transient states. Positive recurrence
is an important property that will allow us to compute asymptotic state probabilities for a model.
Schwier explains the conditions for this property and how to calculate the asymptotic, or steady
state, probabilities [24].
Deterministic models do not have states where the same symbol can cause more than one
possible outbound transition. That is, in any state of a deterministic model, there will be a unique
transition for each possible symbol. Figure 3.5 demonstrates this property. The model in 3.5a is
non-deterministic because at state S0, an A can cause either a transition to S1 or back to S0. The
model in 3.5b is deterministic. This property is important because it means that any sequence of
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Figure 3.4: A model that contains a transient state
(a) Non-deterministic (b) Deterministic
Figure 3.5: Example of determinism property
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transitions has only one possible sequence of states. In this work, the sequence of transitions is called
the data and the sequence of states is known as the path taken by that data through the model.
3.5 Proof-of-Concept
Our first experiment was to test the data collection, symbolization, and CSSR steps. This
proof-of-concept test was designed to be very simple, but still require each of the steps to work
properly to achieve the desired result.
Using the private Tor network, two systems were configured with simple client and server
processes. One computer was designated as the server and the other was the client. The client would
connect to the server and just listen. The server, once the client had connected, would send data
packets to the client based on a preloaded model. The model used by the server in this experiment
is the one depicted in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Original model used by the server
The server starts the process by randomly selecting a state in its model to be the start state.
To send each packet, a transition is taken from the current state and the corresponding symbol is
sent in a packet to the client. If there is more than one possible transition out of a state, the
transition is chosen randomly, weighted on the probability of each transition. Most importantly, the
time between sending each packet depends on the symbol of the transition. Each symbol is assigned
a specified time delay in milliseconds and the server waits that amount of time before sending the
packet to the client.
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For example, if the server generates an A from its model, a packet is sent after a delay of
0.1 seconds. If the next symbol generated is also an A, then another packet is sent after the same
time delay. If the next symbol is a B, however, then a delay of 0.9 seconds is waited before sending
the next packet.
This technique relates the inter-packet delays to transitions of the HMM. In other words,
the transitions of the model will be our observations of the underlying process. This is the behavior
we expect in real protocols, that the packet times will be related to processing required by a specific
task in the process.
The client and server processes are set to generate 10,000 symbols of data. All of the packet
times are captured and symbolized using the processes described in previous sections of this chapter.
CSSR is used to construct a model from the symbolized data. With L = 2, CSSR yields the model
shown in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: Model reconstructed from captured data
We can see that the reconstructed model has the same state structure and almost the same
transition probabilities as the original model. If the process is re-run for 100,000 symbols, we find
that the probabilities do match the original model.
This illustrates a point made earlier during the discussion of CSSR. If an insufficient amount
of data samples are used, the algorithm only creates a model of the data, not of the underlying
process. To get a model of the underlying process, there must be enough data samples available
to fully describe that process. This is what makes the difference in the transition probabilities, in
seeing 0.91 instead of 0.90.
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3.6 Model Confidence
The results of our proof-of-concept experiment demonstrate that we need to have a way of
calculating if we used enough data. And in cases when we did not use enough, we must find out
how much more data we would need to use to construct a statistically confident model.
It makes sense that we can never be completely sure that the model we get perfectly rep-
resents the underlying process. Every model we build is constructed from a finite amount of data.
We would have to use an infinite amount of data to get a model which perfectly represents the un-
derlying process. This is because if the first time at which a given event occurs approaches infinity,
the probability of seeing it approaches zero. If we know that there is an extremely small probability
that our captured data contains all possible events, we need to capture more data until we achieve
an acceptable probability that we saw everything.
Fortunately, Schwier provides a method to calculate the amount of data samples necessary
to achieve a specific level of confidence in a model [24]. It is calculated from the smallest asymptotic
state probability in a model, or in other words, the least likely event to occur. The result can be
tuned by the parameter κ, which is usually set to 0.05 times the smallest asymptotic state probability.
κ is the probability of seeing a joint event. Schwier defines a joint event as an occurrence where the
system takes a transition that has not yet been observed. The higher κ is, the lesser the amount of
data will be needed. The offset is that there is more risk in choosing a higher value of κ because it
assumes that the system is less likely to take an unknown transition.
As an example, imagine that a process is represented by the model in Figure 3.8. The
transition of the dotted line occurs very rarely, say once a millennium. If we observe this process for
any period of time less than a millennium, there is a chance that we may not ever see this transition.
In fact, the probability of not seeing it increases as our observation time decreases.
If we happen to observe the process at the right time and see the dotted transition, CSSR
will add it to our model. But should we have added it? The z-test may tell us that we need data
for fifty millennia before we confidently understand the conditions in which the dotted transition
occurs. For all practical purposes, we do not have that kind of time. What we are left with is an
event about which we are unsure. It may happen under the same conditions every millennium, may
happen under different conditions, or it may have just been noise and never happen again.
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Figure 3.8: Model of a process with a very rare event
In practice, we find that the best solution is to ignore the event and note that rarely occurring
events have not been included in the model. We record the probability at which we start ignoring
these rare events. This provides us with a model that works most of the time and a measurement
that tells us how often we should expect it to not be able to fully represent the process.
3.6.1 Pruning Rare Events
To handle rare events and maintain model confidence, we use a threshold on asymptotic
state probabilities to prune them out. After a model has been constructed with CSSR, it may have
transitions that are taken very rarely and states that are visited very rarely. By setting a threshold
on the asymptotic state probabilities, we accomplish the goal from the end of the previous section;
rare events are trimmed from the model. The value of the probability threshold is how often we
should expect the process to deviate from the model.
A state’s asymptotic state probability is a measure of how often that state is visited as the
data length goes to infinity. More specifically, it is the probability that the model will be in that
state during an infinite period of time. In his work, Schwier explains how to calculate this value for
each state in a model [24].
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Any state with an asymptotic probability below the threshold is removed from the model.
Any transitions going to or leaving from that state are also removed. Finally, any state or set of
states that cannot be reached due to a removal are also deleted. This leaves the model with only
the states and transitions for which we have enough data. When we are unable to collect enough
data to be confident in the full model, we leave out the parts where we would need more data to
achieve confidence.
3.7 Pruning Experiment
We then test this process over Tor. In a Tor connection, there are times when a circuit fails
or changes, or a relay gets too busy and delays a packet. There is some extra variable latency that
affects roughly one out of every 200 packets. These glitches cause the packet to arrive later than it
should have and because of that, it is incorrectly symbolized.
Typically, noise in the data can be mitigated by collecting more and more data until the
underlying process overwhelms the noise. This works well for the simple model in Section 3.5. But
for more complicated systems, glitches at different times can cause many more errors in the model
because there is a larger state space.
For this experiment, we use the same client and server method described in Section 3.5. All
we change is the server’s model and the symbol-to-delay translation table. The model now used by
the server is the model in Figure 3.9. The translation table is Table 3.4.
Symbol Delay
(in seconds)
A 0.2
B 0.4
C 0.1
Y 0.3
Z 0.5
Table 3.4: Symbol-to-delay translation table for pruning experiment
The process is configured to generate 200,000 data packets. After completion of the process,
deltas of the captured packet times are calculated and symbolized. Visual inspection of the data
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Figure 3.9: Original five state model for the pruning experiment
reveals that added delays cause various samples to be symbolized incorrectly. For example, the
following subsequence is found in the data:
W = [ A C Y B A Z B C Z Z C Y ]
However, since we know the model, we know that the subsequence should really be:
W = [ A C Y B C Z B C Z A C Y ]
But CSSR does not know this. CSSR can only make a model from the data it has been
given. The model it constructs will have extra states and transitions to handle these glitches. This
means having a much bigger model than expected, which is much different from the original model.
Figure 3.10 shows the model that CSSR constructs for these first 200,000 packets.
When the confidence test is run on the model, we find that it requires 20,624,750 data
samples. This means we need to capture more data and rebuild. Because the amount of required
data is so large, it has to be generated in lengths of 200,000 packets at a time. After each set of
200,000, we rebuild the model and run the confidence test again.
Oddly enough, the required amount of data keeps increasing with each set. This is because
different incorrect symbolizations at different points in the data sequence cause even more states
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Figure 3.10: Model that is reconstructed from first 200,000 packets of captured data
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and transitions to be added to the model. All of these new events are very low probability, which
results in a lower minimum asymptotic state probability for each new set. This lower probability
causes the confidence test to increase the amount of data required.
Even after capturing a million packets, the required amount from the confidence test con-
tinues to increase. The smallest asymptotic state probability and corresponding result from the
confidence test are plotted against the number of packets captured in Figure 3.11. The steady
increase suggests we will not easily capture enough data to rebuild the model confidently.
Figure 3.11: Plot of model confidence results as more data is captured
As discussed in Section 3.6.1, the alternative is to prune the low-probability states and
transitions from the model. The generated model using all million packets is shown in Figure 3.12.
The model contains 79 states and 274 transitions. Analysis of the asymptotic state probabilities
shows a large gap between 71 of the states and the other eight. The 71 have probabilities below
0.06%, while the other eight have probabilities above 8.2%. That is a break of over two orders of
magnitude.
The difference between the states generated by the actual underlying process and the states
generated by glitches and noise is obvious. This separation makes a good pruning threshold. Fol-
lowing the pruning process, the model in Figure 3.13 results with a threshold of 0.01 (or 1%). By
manually tracing the model, we find that it is essentially the same as the original model of Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.12: Model that is reconstructed from all million packets of captured data
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Figure 3.13: Result after pruning low-probability states and transitions
3.8 Summary
In this chapter we described the model construction part of our attack and specified a
process to build HMMs from data samples of a network protocol. These models are to be built
beforehand from labeled training data in order to provide a library of models for use in protocol
detection. A proof-of-concept experiment on our private Tor network showed that a model could
successfully be reconstructed from inter-packet timings. Additionally, we discussed how to handle
problems with variable latency that would disrupt model construction. Pruning the reconstructed
model successfully showed that underlying original model was still captured, but had just been
obscured by noise.
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Chapter 4
Detection
Once a model has been constructed from a set of training data, it can immediately be used
for detection. Determining confidence interval bounds on each transition in the model will allow us
to know how likely it is that the data can be explained by a model. This method will detect the
protocol in a Tor connection. To detect the path, we go one step further once we have two captures
that are matching to the same model with confidence intervals. We trace the state sequence for each
of the two captures and say they are the same connection if the state sequences match.
4.1 Confidence Intervals
For the reasons described in Section 2.3.3, confidence intervals provide a better alternative
to maximum likelihood when determining whether data matches a model. To compute confidence
intervals, the data to be matched is traced through the model and the interval bounds are estimated
using frequency count for each transition.
We track two counters for each transition, ci,j and ci. ci is the number of times that we
have the opportunity to take the transition, and ci,j is the number of times we actually take it. In
terms of the model in Figure 4.1, c0 is the number of times that we are in state S0 while tracing our
data. c0,1 is the number of times we take the A transition to S1 and c0,2 is the number of times we
take the B transition to S2.
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Figure 4.1: A model used demonstrate the calculation of confidence intervals
These counters are used to calculate three values for each transition: an estimate of the
transition probability, and the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval. The estimated
transition probability is simply Equation 4.1.
pˆi,j =
ci,j
ci
(4.1)
For Figure 4.1, we would expect to take A about half of the time and B about half of the time. This
means that each c0,1 and c0,2 would be half of ci.
The confidence interval bounds are calculated by Equation 4.2.
pi,j ± Zα
2
√
pi,j(1− pi,j)
ci,j
(4.2)
Notice that p is used here and not pˆ. This means that the intervals are always calculated using
the transition probability in the original model, not the estimated one. Also, Z is taken from the
Normal distribution. The α is typically 0.05, meaning that we desire 95% confidence intervals. This
is another way of saying that the probability of making an error by our decision boundaries is 5%.
After all of the data in the test set has been traced through, if the estimated transition
probability is within the confidence interval, we have found a match. This means that the data
is consistent with the model since the value estimated from the data fit within the bound on the
model’s parameter.
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4.2 Protocol Detection
The flowchart in Figure 4.2 describes the process used for protocol detection. As input, the
process requires a library of models and a test sequence of data. Three parameters are also provided
for input that can be used to tune the results: window size, confidence interval percentage, and
rejection rate.
Figure 4.2: Flowchart describing the protocol detection process
We will sometimes refer to the library of models as a bootstrap tree. It is essentially just
a data structure that has functions for efficiently determining which models contain the symbols in
our test data. This structure and the models within it must be compiled prior to performing the
detection process.
The test data sequence, however, can all be captured and the detection performed offline at
a later time, or it can be done online in real-time as data samples are received. The flowchart works
for both modes. If in offline mode, the data file is read line by line as input to the process. And
in online mode, a packet capture program like tshark can pipe the latest packet time to the STDIN
of the detector program. It is even possible to SSH to another system and have it run the tshark
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capture program on that system, returning all of the STDOUT data back to your terminal, which
can then be piped to the detector program. Many options exist for getting the test sequence into
the detector, regardless of the mode in which it is used.
The first step that is taken after reading in a new data sample is to compute the delta and
symbolize it. A separate variable holds the value of the last data sample (the time of the last packet).
This is subtracted from the incoming packet’s time, leaving the delta. If it was the first packet seen,
the previous time variable is populated and the rest of the detection steps are skipped; we must
have at least two packets before we actually get our first symbol of data. To get the symbol, the
delta value can be translated by looking up the appropriate range for it in a table. We only work
with the symbols, so the packet time and the delta can be discarded after symbolization.
The next step is window management. The window is a sliding window with the latest w
data samples. The window size parameter w is one of the three user-specified tuning parameters
mentioned earlier. When a new packet comes in, it is pushed on to the end of the data structure
for the window. If the size of the window data is greater than the specified window size w, then the
oldest element is popped off the front of the queue.
Once it is full, the window is used to calculate the confidence intervals. The bootstrap tree
returns all of its models that will accept the symbols in the window, and a model with confidence
intervals on the transitions is created for each of them.
Out of all the transitions in each model, a certain percent of them will have an estimated
probability that falls within the confidence interval. This percentage tells us how likely it is that
that model represents the test data. If this percentage is above the user-defined rejection rate, we
can say that it is a match. Note that there may be more than one matching model at each window.
At this point, a tie-breaker can be used to select just one, whichever has the highest percent of
matching transitions.
The user receives the name of the model(s) that matched the data and their match percent-
ages as output. Note that this whole process is just for one window. As each sample arrives, the
window slides forward and the whole process is repeated. The process ends when there are no more
incoming data samples or when it is stopped by the user.
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4.3 Viterbi Path
While performing protocol detection, the window of data is traced through the model to
calculate confidence interval bounds. As an additional step, we can store the list of states that are
visited as the data is traced. This sequence of states is known as the Viterbi path.
More officially, the Viterbi path is the most likely path that a sequence of data takes through
a model [51, 24]. In our models, even though the definition is the same, calculating the Viterbi path
is very trivial. This is because there is no probability involved in tracing the path. There will always
only be a single path through the model for any given data sequence and start state. As mentioned
before, this is due to the fact that all of the models created by CSSR will be deterministic.
Given any sequence of data and a model, the path can be determined by Algorithm 1. The
algorithm does not need to know the starting state of the model. It first searches the model for all
possible start states by looking for an outbound transition matching the first symbol of data. From
there, the data is traced from each possible start state until a point arises where there is no possible
transition for a symbol, or until the data has been fully traced through the model.
Algorithm 1 Get the Viterbi path for a given a data sequence
for each state in the model do
if state has transition == data[0] then
push state onto vector V
end if
end for
if V .length == 0 then
return false
end if
for each state S in V do
set state of model to S
for each symbol p in data do
if state does not have transition == p then
break
end if
advance the model
push state id onto vector path
end for
if path.length == data.length then
return path
end if
end for
return false
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Algorithm 2 adds window management of two data sets to the functionality of Algorithm 1
to generate detection rates. The algorithm takes two data sets and a window size as input, and
returns the number of windows that either matched, got rejected, or were accepted by the model,
but did not match up. A “match” should occur if the two data sets are from the same instance
of the same process. An “accepted, but no match” should occur if the two data sets are from the
same process, but not the same instance of it. A “rejection” should occur if the data sets are from
different processes.
Algorithm 2 Perform matching using Viterbi path
Require: data1.length == data2.length
initialize two queues, w1 and w2
add data1[ 0:window size–2 ] to w1 and data2[ 0:window size–2 ] to w2
for i = window size–1 to data1.length do
append data1[i] to w1 and data2[i] to w2
if queue size > window size then
pop off the front (oldest element)
end if
using Algorithm 1, path1 = viterbi(w1) and path2 = viterbi(w2)
if (path1 or path2) == false then
Output: rejected
else if path1 == path2 then
Output: matched
else
Output: accepted, but no match
end if
end for
4.3.1 Model Path vs. Tor Path
Sometimes, the use of the word “path” can be somewhat confusing. This is because there
is a path through the model and a path through the Tor network. The path through the model, the
Viterbi path, is the unique sequence of states visited as a result of following the transition symbols.
This only applies to one of our hidden Markov models and is completely separate from Tor.
The path through the Tor network is the sequence of onion routers, or relays, that proxy
a stream through Tor between the sender and the receiver. There are by default three relays in a
circuit which define the path taken through the network.
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The connection between the two is that it is possible to determine the Tor path by matching
up the Viterbi paths taken by data captured at various nodes in the network. If we take on the
role of the global observer over a Tor network, we can capture traffic from all of the relays. At this
point, it will be possible to determine which three relays are involved in a user’s Tor circuit.
4.4 Path Matching Experiment
To test the path matching process, we devise another experiment using the client and server
test programs. The client connects to the server, which sends packets based on the five state model
in Figure 4.3. The process runs among two systems that are connected to the Tor network, as is
shown in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.3: Five state model used for path matching experiment
Figure 4.4: Diagram of path matching experiment showing Tor network
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Instead of capturing training data and building a model from that, we will just use the
original model for matching with new test data. If we had captured new training data, our model
construction process would be exactly the same as that in Section 3.7; the same process is used to
generate that model.
To get the test sets, packet captures are run on both systems, A and B. This yields two
data sets of the same instance of the same process, but from different prospectives. The paths for
these two sets should match up since they are the same instance of the same process. Results of
matching are shown in Table 4.1.
Detection Rate Rejection Rate
w = 10 97.23% 2.77%
w = 20 94.66% 5.34%
w = 30 92.12% 7.88%
w = 40 89.79% 10.21%
w = 50 87.51% 12.49%
Table 4.1: Results for path matching experiment
4.5 Flow Correlation
An alternative approach to detection is to use the flow correlation method [25, 26]. Basically,
a distance metric is calculated between a raw time series and all of the other data sets. The one
with the smallest distance value is declared the most likely to be the match. Note that this method
requires a comparison of all system on the network, not just any two. The necessary steps for
computation are described in Algorithm 3.
There are two correlation measures [26] which can be used: a time-spectrum approach
and a frequency-spectrum approach based on a matched filter. We select the frequency-spectrum
approach. After converting the time data into pattern vectors, we calculate the discrete fast Fourier
transform [56] of the pattern vectors. Then, using the following equation, we compute the distance
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Algorithm 3 Perform matching using flow correlation with windowing
Require: all other data sets are the same length as data1
for i = 0 to (data1.length - window size) do
for each data set j other than data1 do
partition data1 and j into subsequences of time length T
for each subsequence, k do
store k.length into pattern vector
end for
perform the fast Fourier transform on each pattern vector, Xf = fft(X) and Yf = fft(Y )
calculate the distance measure using Equation 4.3
end for
select match for this window as the argmin of the distance measures
end for
measure, which records how much difference there is between the data sets.
dx,y =
√
〈Yf , Yf 〉
〈Xf , Yf 〉
(4.3)
4.5.1 Advantages of Flow Correlation
There are distinct differences in the two approaches of Viterbi path matching and flow
correlation. The flow correlation method is a direct comparison of the time series, whereas our
path matching method first symbolizes the data and matches it to a training model. The initial
requirements of our method, a training model and window size, are not required by flow correlation.
It is an advantage for flow correlation that it does not require a model to be constructed from
training data prior to matching. It directly compares the time sequences without first translating
the problem to a model representation of an underlying protocol. This could be an advantage in the
sense that it is easier to implement and there are less factors with which to contend.
One such factor is the window size. With flow correlation, the entire data set can be directly
compared. The implementation in Algorithm 3 only involves windowing so that it will be easy to
compare the results with values from path matching. Without windowing, all the data available is
used to do the correlation, which increases the accuracy of the measure. In our matching, we cannot
use all of the data because it becomes more and more likely that a glitch will disrupt the path.
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4.5.2 Disadvantages of Flow Correlation
Flow correlation also has its disadvantages. The most notable is that it requires the ad-
versary to be a global observer. He must be capturing data on every Tor node in the network and
correlating them all together to find the other end with the lowest distance value. It is very unlikely
that this would happen given the size of the Tor network today.
Even if the scope of the correlation is reduced, it is more difficult to run the attack online
in real-time. Each node in the correlation set needs to have an active packet capture feeding the
timing data back to a central server which can perform the correlations amongst all of the data
sets. Whereas, with the Viterbi path matching, an adversary need only watch two nodes using the
network to get an idea of the likelihood that they are communicating.
Windowing can also be a disadvantage depending on the usage conditions. If only short
time periods are available for test data, the correlation will be less accurate at the smaller data
amounts. With windowing, path matching is already set to handle these small amounts of test data.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we described the protocol and path detection processes that make use of
the models generated by the work in the previous chapter. Our implementation of these processes
was detailed and an experiment was conducted with them to make sure they worked correctly.
Our detection procedures are unique from more traditional approaches because they do not rely on
maximum likelihood to select the best match out of a set. We only need test data and a single model
to determine a statistical measure of how well that model represents the data. For path matching in
the Tor attack, we only need two systems both using Tor to tell if they are communicating together
or with another party.
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Chapter 5
An Illustrative Example
This chapter presents an illustrative example covering all of the techniques described in
Chapters 3 and 4. We start with a network process and go through all of the necessary steps to be
able to perform detection. We show results for the detection and compare them with results from
the flow correlation technique.
5.1 Experimental Setup
5.1.1 Layout
This experiment uses the same private Tor network used by previous experiments, except
this time, four systems will be involved. We designate two pairs of systems to communicate on the
Tor network at the same time. Each pair of systems is communicating between themselves and are
running the exact same process.
The diagram in Figure 5.1 shows the layout of the systems used in the experiment. The
system 192.168.69.10 will communicate with 192.168.69.13, and 192.168.69.11 will communicate with
192.168.69.12. Each of their connections goes through Tor and we do not record which relays were
being used. We will need to use path detection in order to determine which two computers are
talking.
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Figure 5.1: Layout of the ping-pong experiment
5.1.2 The Ping-Pong Process
The collective process that each pair is running is referred to as the “ping-pong” process.
In this process, the client end is no longer just a passive listener. Each party runs both a client
and a server thread that can communicate together inside the computer. One of the two systems is
designated as the master, which starts the communications, while the other, the slave, waits for the
master to start the process.
The master begins at state zero and takes a transition in its model. The model used by
the master is shown in Figure 5.2a. It then looks up the associated delay, in milliseconds, for the
symbol it generated and sends the packet after that amount of time has passed. The symbol-to-delay
translation table used by the master is Table 5.1a.
Once the slave receives the packet from the master, it also starts at state zero in its model and
takes a random transition. The model used by the slave in this experiment is shown in Figure 5.2b.
The slave has its own symbol-to-delay translation table to convert symbols from its model into time
delays. The table used by the slave is Table 5.1b.
The process continues back and forth until the required amount of packets have been gen-
erated. The delays of the packets leaving the master have two components: the delay added by the
master and the delay added by the slave. When we symbolize, we have to take this into account and
break the range out into ten symbols. There is a symbol for each of the five symbols in the master’s
model combined with either of the two symbols from the slave’s model.
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(a) 5-state model used by the master (b) 2-state model used by the
slave
Figure 5.2: Models used in the ping-pong experiment
Symbol Delay
(in milliseconds)
A 200
B 400
C 100
Y 300
Z 500
(a) Delays used by master
Symbol Delay
(in milliseconds)
A 10
B 50
(b) Delays used by slave
Table 5.1: Symbol-to-delay translation tables for ping-pong experiment
5.2 Data Capture
Once again, data is captured using tshark. In order to see all of the data passing through
the network stack at each end, the exit node functionality has to be disabled for any systems in
the experiment. This is because Tor is smart enough to know when a destination is running a Tor
relay. It will delibrately choose that relay as the last node in the circuit (the exit node), so that the
connection to the final destination port occurs locally and does not need to go across the network.
This is good for privacy, because it reduces the chance of an adversary spying on the last
hop of the connection, which is usually unencrypted. But it is bad for us because tshark would have
to watch all traffic entering the Tor relay vice to a separate port in order to see the traffic.
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On the other end of the connection, we use a small program called 3proxy [57] to create
a local TCP port forward. Any data sent to the port is automatically forwarded along to a Tor
SOCKS proxy for entrance to the Tor network. This is a very useful tool for programs that do not
have SOCKS support, such as with our small client / server test programs.
5.3 Symbolization
To symbolize, the numerical derivative of the CDF (the PDF) is plotted to determine the
ranges. We know that we are looking for ten symbols. Figure 5.3 shows the plot with ranges overlaid
by the dotted lines.
Figure 5.3: Plot of PDF of data with selected ranges and symbols overlaid
The combined symbolization table contains ranges to convert delays into one of ten symbols.
There is a symbol to represent each of the ten possible combinations of symbols from the five state
and two state models. Table 5.2 shows the symbolization table we derive from the plot analysis.
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Symbol Range
(in seconds)
C+A’ {0.0000,0.1500}
C+B’ {0.1501,0.2100}
A+A’ {0.2101,0.2500}
A+B’ {0.2501,0.3100}
Y+A’ {0.3101,0.3500}
Y+B’ {0.3501,0.4100}
B+A’ {0.4101,0.4500}
B+B’ {0.4501,0.5100}
Z+A’ {0.5101,0.5500}
Z+B’ {0.5501,10.0000}
Table 5.2: Ranges for all ten symbols of ping pong experiment
5.4 Training Model Construction
As data is captured in increments of 200,000 packets, CSSR is used to construct a model at
each step. By running the confidence test at each successive interval, we find that we have the same
problem described in Section 3.7. As the data used for model construction increases, the smallest
asymptotic state probability decreases and the amount of data required by the model confidence
test increases. At a million packets captured, the confidence test tells us we need over 288 million
packets. We cannot capture enough data because of the glitches.
Using the same approach from Section 3.7, we stop capturing after a million packets and
just keep the model constructed with that amount of data. We can later prune out states and
transitions that have a very low probability of occurring. The model reconstructed from a million
packets is too large to include as a figure. It has 425 states and 1,523 transitions—over five times
as large as the model shown in Figure 3.12.
For comparison purposes, we also use artificial data to generate the combined model. Ar-
tificial data is generated from the 5 state and 2 state machines and is concatenated together to get
data for the combined model. In other words, an A from the 5 state model and a B from the 2 state
model yield an A+B’ symbol for that sample in our concatenated data set.
CSSR with L = 3 is used to construct the model shown in Figure 5.4. By manually
comparing it to the models from Figure 5.2, we find that it is the correctly combined model.
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Figure 5.4: A combination of the 5 state and 2 state models, generated from artificial training data
5.5 Pruning
To select a good value for pruning, a histogram is made of the asymptotic state probabilities
of the reconstructed model. The histogram is shown in Figure 5.5. From looking at the histogram,
it is obvious that a large majority of the probabilities are very small. In fact, 378 of the 425 states
have an asymptotic state probability below 0.02% while the other 47 states have a probability above
0.3%. We will threshold in this gap.
We choose β = 0.0005 as the threshold value and prune the model of any states with
asymptotic state probabilities below this value. The resulting model is shown in Figure 5.6. The
pruned model is considerably reduced in size from the original model, but still contains 99.3% of
the information from that model. This is because the original model would use the majority of its
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Figure 5.5: A histogram of the asymptotic state probabilities
states less than 0.7% of the time.
If we run the model confidence test on the pruned model, we find that only 27,990 symbols
are needed to make a confident model. Since we have a million symbols, there is more than enough
data to be confident in the remaining states and transitions after pruning.
It is possible to prune the model too aggressively. If this is done, it eliminates some of the
important states and takes away paths for valid data. For instance, at β = 0.013 the model, shown
in Figure 5.7, now only contains the most common events in the original process. It is missing
transitions for all of the symbol patterns that can occur in the original model. This will cause an
excessively high rate of rejections when performing detection, which is confirmed in the next section.
5.6 Detection Results
After constructing the models, confidence interval and Viterbi path detection was performed
against the systems using Tor. Recall from Section 5.1.1 that .10 and .13 are communicating together
and .11 and .12 are communicating. The first three octets of the IP addresses (192.168.69) are
omitted to save space in the tables.
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Figure 5.6: The training model pruned with a threshold of β = 0.0005
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Figure 5.7: The training model pruned with a threshold of β = 0.013
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5.6.1 Detection Rates
Detection rates are compiled for path matching using various models. Specifically, we present
results for the following models:
• Table 5.3: Original, combined model from Figure 5.4
• Table 5.4: Reconstructed model, no pruning
• Table 5.5: Reconstructed model pruned at β = 0.0005 (shown in Figure 5.6)
• Table 5.6: Reconstructed model pruned at β = 0.013 (shown in Figure 5.7)
.10 .11 .12
.11 0.02%
.12 0.02% 93.78%
.13 95.24% 0.02% 0.02%
(a) Window size = 10
.10 .11 .12
.11 0.00%
.12 0.00% 86.98%
.13 90.62% 0.00% 0.00%
(b) Window size = 25
.10 .11 .12
.11 0.00%
.12 0.00% 72.51%
.13 78.44% 0.00% 0.00%
(c) Window size = 50
Table 5.3: Detection rates for system pairs using original model
The rates in each table are the percentage of the windows that have matching paths when
both windows are accepted by the model. In other words, they represent the ability of an adversary
to correlate Tor connections. The higher the rate, the more often it is that the process works as
expected. This means that each window is accepted by the model (that it does not contain any events
which the model cannot handle), and that the Viterbi paths of the two windows match exactly.
In the results for each model, larger window sizes have lower true positive rates. This is
because a larger window allows a glitch to disrupt the path matching for a longer period of time.
New data must come in to slide the window along and eventually flush out the glitch. This takes
longer when the window size is large and so the detection rates are lower.
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.10 .11 .12
.11 0.02%
.12 0.02% 95.88%
.13 96.66% 0.02% 0.02%
(a) Window size = 10
.10 .11 .12
.11 0.00%
.12 0.00% 90.36%
.13 92.20% 0.00% 0.00%
(b) Window size = 25
.10 .11 .12
.11 0.00%
.12 0.00% 82.08%
.13 85.46% 0.00% 0.00%
(c) Window size = 50
Table 5.4: Detection rates for system pairs using reconstructed model
.10 .11 .12
.11 0.02%
.12 0.02% 94.40%
.13 95.99% 0.02% 0.02%
(a) Window size = 10
.10 .11 .12
.11 0.00%
.12 0.00% 86.98%
.13 90.62% 0.00% 0.00%
(b) Window size = 25
.10 .11 .12
.11 0.00%
.12 0.00% 75.99%
.13 82.62% 0.00% 0.00%
(c) Window size = 50
Table 5.5: Detection rates for system pairs using reconstructed model pruned at β = 0.0005
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.10 .11 .12
.11 0.01%
.12 0.01% 3.79%
.13 3.85% 0.00% 0.00%
(a) Window size = 10
.10 .11 .12
.11 0.00%
.12 0.00% 0.02%
.13 0.02% 0.00% 0.00%
(b) Window size = 25
.10 .11 .12
.11 0.00%
.12 0.00% 0.00%
.13 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
(c) Window size = 50
Table 5.6: Detection rates for system pairs using reconstructed model pruned at β = 0.013
Out of the window sizes shown, w = 10 provides the most optimum result, i.e. is closest to
the point (1,0) in a receiver operating characteristic curve. This value gives the largest amount of
true positives while limiting false positives.
We can see from the values in Table 5.4 that the reconstructed model which is not pruned
is the best for matching the data. Using this model in practice, however, is extremely difficult as
the numerous states and transitions cause a large increase in the processing time for the detector.
The model that is pruned at β = 0.0005 provides a good compromise between higher
detection rates and lower processing time. Its results are slightly worse than the reconstructed
model, but are better than using the original model.
The over-pruned model does not fare well. Its detection rates approach 4% in the best of
the test cases. This is reasonable because paths that are taken reasonably often are stripped from
the model. As confirmed by the results, the model is rejecting the vast majority of the windows.
5.6.2 Rejection Rates
There are three possible decisions the detector can make for each pair of windows:
1. That they are both accepted by the model and their Viterbi paths exactly match
2. That they are both accepted by the model, but their Viterbi paths do not match
3. That one or more of the windows are rejected by the model
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A rejection means that there is an event in the window that cannot be explained by the state
structure and transitions of the model. It also means that confidence intervals cannot be calculated
from the window.
Ideally, a rejection only happens if the two processes from which the data windows came
are different. If the processes are the same, like in this experiment, a rejection should not occur.
However, in practice extra latency results in glitches that cause a symbol to be misclassified. Because
of this, it is important that we keep rejection rates in mind when selecting our model and window
size.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show the rejection rates for the various combinations of window sizes and
available models. Table 5.7 shows the case of matching the .10 data to data from .13 and Table 5.8
shows the case of .11 and .12.
Original Recon. Pruned at Pruned at
Model Model β = 0.0005 β = 0.013
w = 10 3.83% 1.48% 3.06% 96.15%
w = 25 7.23% 3.63% 7.23% 99.98%
w = 50 17.87% 7.07% 13.48% 100.00%
Table 5.7: Rejection rates for .10 – .13
Original Recon. Pruned at Pruned at
Model Model β = 0.0005 β = 0.013
w = 10 5.00% 1.94% 4.31% 96.21%
w = 25 10.14% 4.85% 10.14% 99.98%
w = 50 22.89% 9.48% 18.96% 100.00%
Table 5.8: Rejection rates for .11 – .12
Again, the best results are obtained with the reconstructed model and a window size of 10.
The reconstructed model still rejects some windows because new glitches are seen during collection
of the test data that are not seen while collecting the training data used to build the model. Since
they are not seen in the training data, the model cannot account for them and rejects those windows.
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These figures allow us to see that for the model pruned at β = 0.013, all of the false negatives
are caused by rejections, rather than mismatching Viterbi paths. This is interesting, because there
may be a way to still use this model if the rejection rate could be improved. We discuss an idea for
this in Section 6.2.
5.7 Comparison to Flow Correlation
We now compare the results of the flow correlation method from Section 4.5 with our Viterbi
path matching method for this experiment.
There are some fundamental differences in the two methods. First, flow correlation is a
maximum likelihood approach. Because of this, it chooses the combination of data sets that is most
likely and classifies them together. Even if none of the sets are anything like the others, it will still
choose the best relationship. This means that we get a result for every window and that there are
no rejections like with the confidence interval method.
Second, flow correlation does not detect protocols, it merely matches up the timings after
they have been converted into pattern vectors. Third, there is an additional parameter—a period
T . T controls the bin size for the packet counter when the time vectors are converted to pattern
vectors. If T = 2, then the elements of the pattern vector contain the number of packets with times
t < 2, 2 ≤ t < 4, 4 ≤ t < 6, etc. The selection of T can have a large impact on the results.
These differences require that we present the results in a different manner. We still window
the data to maintain consistency across the two methods, but there are no detection or rejection
rates for each combination. Instead, we take data from one node and compare it to all of the
other nodes. The value recorded is the true positive rate, which indicates that the flow correlation
algorithm correctly chose the other node.
Table 5.9 shows the true positive rates for .10 and .13, while Table 5.10 shows the rates for
.11 and .12. Any other match or tied value is considered an incorrect classification. The tables show
how the rate varies with respect to window size, w, and period size (bin size), T .
The best rate in the tables comes when the window size is highest and the bin size is smallest.
The larger window size means using more data for the classification. This result is consistent with
those of Zhu et al. They found that detection rates improved asymptotically to 100% as more and
more data was used for classification [25, 26].
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T = 0.5 s T = 1 s T = 2 s
w = 10 84.33% 58.62% 67.44%
w = 25 99.51% 86.37% 75.86%
w = 50 99.94% 96.97% 78.97%
Table 5.9: True positive rates for .10 – .13
T = 0.5 s T = 1 s T = 2 s
w = 10 86.78% 67.20% 67.53%
w = 25 99.64% 90.32% 84.66%
w = 50 99.98% 98.08% 86.84%
Table 5.10: True positive rates for .11 – .12
The higher window size actually works better for flow correlation because it does not rely on
matching the data to a model first. This is both a good thing and a bad thing. The negative aspect
is that we lose the ability to detect protocols, but the positive aspect is that we handle glitches
better. In the Viterbi path analysis any incorrect symbol can disrupt the path match, making it
better to keep the window sizes small in order to see the bad symbols as little as possible. With
flow correlation, however, it is better to see as much data at once as possible so that other values
can overwhelm the problematic ones in the distance calculations.
Given the choice, we actually prefer the smaller window sizes. This is because we get more
granularity within the data sets and can detect a change in behavior more quickly. For example, if
the data sets from computer A and B are matching, but all of a sudden computer A starts talking to
computer D instead of B, we will notice the change more quickly with a smaller window size. This
is because data from the first behavior clears out from the window more quickly since the window is
smaller and has less data in it. Once a majority of the data in the window is from the new behavior,
we will begin making the correct classification again.
The bin size T must be selected to provide the best balance of latency flexibility. If there is a
great deal of variable latency in the connection, higher values of T would work better because those
extra latencies would not move packets to a new bin. Lower values of T work best in this scenario
because they give the most resolution. The local network environment does not cause a great deal
of glitches relative to how many there would be on a connection on the public Tor network.
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The latency adapting behavior of T is more noticeable in the smallest window size. In the
smallest window size, any variable delay is emphasized more since there are less other symbols to
regulate the averages. This is why the rate is actually slightly better for T = 2 than for T = 1 in
both scenarios with a window size of w = 10.
The final tables, Table 5.11 and 5.12, show a side-by-side comparison of the detection rates
for both methods. For the Viterbi path column, the results are when the pruned model (β = 0.0005)
was used. And for the flow correlation column, the results are when T = 1 second. These parameter
choices represent the middle ground for each method to provide a better basis of comparison.
Viterbi Path Flow Correlation
w = 10 95.99% 58.62%
w = 25 90.62% 86.37%
w = 50 82.62% 96.97%
Table 5.11: Method comparison of detection rates for .10 – .13
Viterbi Path Flow Correlation
w = 10 94.40% 67.20%
w = 25 86.98% 90.32%
w = 50 75.99% 98.08%
Table 5.12: Method comparison of detection rates for .11 – .12
5.8 Summary
The experiment showed that the processes outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 can be used to
successfully model a protocol and use it to match Tor users. Model pruning, as long as the value
of β was not too aggressive, worked very well for the detection process. Its smaller size allowed less
computation time while maintaining some extra paths for the more common glitches. This resulted
in a smaller rejection rate than the original model and more accurate detection results.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Concluding Summary
In this work, we showed how recently developed pattern recognition tools could be applied
to traffic analysis of anonymity systems. We examined their effectiveness on Tor specifically, due to
its popularity and low-latency design. We showed how to use the tools to attack the anonymity and
match the network streams of two or more systems.
A private Tor network was implemented on standalone network for data collection. Custom
client and server programs using this network provided much of the experimental basis for this work.
It was found that the hidden Markov model of an underlying network process could be
reconstructed from observations of the inter-packet timings of the packets. Measures were used to
validate the models and check to make sure enough data was used for their construction. In cases
when not enough data was available, the models could be used after a technique was applied to
prune them of any low-probability states and transitions.
The pruning technique worked well and was validated by the results from detection. Using
a pruned model in the detection step achieved results and runtime between the original model and
reconstructed model without pruning. This was a good compromise when better results were desired
over using the original model, but at a lower runtime than the reconstructed model without pruning.
By calculating confidence intervals and comparing the paths taken by test data through one
of these models, we gained a statistical measure of how likely it was that two systems were talking
through Tor. If two systems were both using Tor, but tunneling different protocols, the confidence
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intervals showed a rejection. If the two systems were both using Tor and the same protocol, the
confidence intervals accepted the data. As an additional step, we found that if the Viterbi paths
match, the two systems were using the same instance of the same protocol.
This type of analysis could allow an adversary to defeat the anonymity of Tor without being
a global observer. If an adversary is able to observe two systems, these tools can be used to determine
if that pair of systems are communicating through the anonymity network.
6.2 Recommendations for Further Research
This work inspired many interesting questions that could not be answered due to time
constraints. We will list and quickly discuss them here as topics for future research.
Most interesting, and probably one of the most important follow-up questions is how well
does the attack work on the real Tor network? Will the increased amount of variable delays over-
whelm the pruning process and reduce detection rates? To answer these questions, the five to two
state ping-pong experiment should be re-run over a wide-area Tor network to see if similar results
can be achieved. Possible options for a larger Tor network could be the public, production network
or maybe a private one on a distributed test environment like PlanetLab [58].
Also, most of the experiments done for this work involved artificially created protocols that
followed the state machines we had given it. More research could be done with real-world protocols
to see if they can be modeled and detected using the same process. Good candidates would include
multiplayer games or Voice over IP (VoIP). It is important to note though that the protocols must
be able to be sent over TCP because Tor will only transport TCP streams. Work done by Wang et
al. seems to suggest that it should be possible with VoIP [59].
In the arms race that is the field of traffic analysis, every new attack brings up the question
“what can be done to defend against it?” We propose that same question here. Using techniques
with Tor that disrupt the timing and order should work very well against this attack because it will
make building the models difficult. Another alternative that has been proposed is to use a distributed
VPN through a half-open Tor circuit. These half open Tor circuits, called hidden services, may be
able to be combined with Bittorrent and OnionCat [60] to produce a system robust at deterring this
attack.
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Another interesting idea would be to replace obviously mistranslated symbols with a wild
card symbol to improve the handling of glitches. Say that Tor introduces a delay of one second into
a packet and that packet gets incorrectly symbolized into some other symbol. If we knew that it
was wrong, we could instead swap it out for our wild card symbol. The wild card symbol would
not stop a path from matching, it would just take on whatever value is needed and allow the path
matching to continue. The problem could become very complex and computationally expensive if
there are many transitions the wild card symbol can take. This would be a challenge to efficiently
enumerate and handle all of the possible path combinations until the right one is found.
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Appendices
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Appendix A How to Configure a Private Tor Network
A small, standalone test network was created to conduct experiments on Tor. This was
done so as to not disturb any nodes that were functioning as part of the live global Tor network
operating on the Internet. This appendix describes the configuration and layout of our Tor testbed
network.
A.1 Network Layout
The network consists of sixteen total systems. All systems are running Tor version 0.2.1.19,
which was the latest stable version as of August 2009 [61]. There are two Dell Optiplex GX260
desktops running CentOS 5, two Dell Precision 370 mini-towers running Fedora Core 6, and twelve
WebDT 166 thin clients running the lightweight Debian-based Damn Small Linux [62]. The network
is a combination of various types of systems on different platforms, much like on the Internet.
Figure 1: Network diagram of the private Tor network testbed
Figure 1 shows the layout of the network. The smaller icons on the left symbolize the thin
clients. Each thin client runs Tor with the client and relay services enabled. Three of the larger Dell
systems run Tor with the client, relay, and directory server services enabled, and the last system
runs Tor with just the client service enabled. Finally, all systems are connected via a network switch.
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A.2 Tor Configuration
Tor determines all of its configuration settings from a file called the torrc file. Settings
listed in this file tell Tor what name to use, what services to run, what types of logging to perform,
what policies to enforce, and, for our standalone environment, which directory servers to use. The
specification of these is important because the relays must know where to upload their descriptors
and the clients must know where they can find a list of relays to use. By default, Tor uses the
directory servers that have been hard-coded into it. By providing a list of our own directory servers,
we are telling Tor to use one of ours and to not use any of the preloaded ones.
1 ## TOR Configuration File
2
3
4 ## Section 1: Basic Settings ##########################################
5
6 ## Send all messages of level ’notice ’ or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
7 #Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
8 ## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
9 Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
10
11 ## If set to 1, Tor will scrub any personally identifying information
12 ## from the log files
13 SafeLogging 0
14
15 ## Start the process in the background
16 RunAsDaemon 1
17
18 ## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc.
19 DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
20
21
22 ## Section 2: Client Settings #########################################
23
24 ## Define on which port the SOCKS client will listen
25 #SocksPort 0 # don ’t function as a client
26 SocksPort 9050 # what port to open for local application connections
27
28 ## Define on which IP address the client will listen
29 #SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 # accept connections only from localhost
30 SocksListenAddress 0.0.0.0 # accept connections from anyone
31
32
33 ## Section 3: Relay Settings ##########################################
34
35 ## A unique name for the server
36 Nickname tigertor10
37
38 ## The IP or FQDN of the server
39 Address 192.168.69.10
40
41 ## Contact info to be published in the directory
42 ContactInfo Nobody <nobody AT example dot com >
43
44 ## Port to advertise for Tor connections
45 ORPort 9001
46
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47 ## Publish server descriptors of certain versions
48 PublishServerDescriptor v2 ,v3
49
50 ## A comma -separated list of exit policies
51 #ExitPolicy accept *:* # any exiting ports/protocols allowed
52 ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exiting ports/protocols allowed
53
54
55
56 ## Section 4: Authoritative Directory Settings ########################
57
58 ## What port to advertise for incoming directory connections
59 DirPort 9030
60
61 ## Become an authoritative directory
62 AuthoritativeDirectory 1
63
64 ## Specify which versions to publish
65 V2AuthoritativeDirectory 1
66 V3AuthoritativeDirectory 1
67
68 ## To make routers show up as "named" in the directory
69 NamingAuthoritativeDirectory 1
70
71 # Display this HTML page at the root of the directory server ’s port
72 DirPortFrontPage /var/lib/tor/webpage.html
73
74 ## Entrance policy for this directory server
75 DirPolicy accept *:* # any ports/protocols allowed
76
77
78 ## Section 5: Settings for running Tor on a private network ###########
79
80 ## List of authoritative routers
81 DirServer tigertor10 v3ident=V3IDENTKEY 192.168.69.10:9030 FINGERPRINT
82 DirServer tigertor11 v3ident=V3IDENTKEY 192.168.69.11:9030 FINGERPRINT
83 DirServer tigertor12 v3ident=V3IDENTKEY 192.168.69.12:9030 FINGERPRINT
84
85 ## Makes running on a private Tor network possible by speeding up the
86 ## voting process and disabling some security restrictions
87 TestingTorNetwork 1
Listing 1: Sample torrc File
Listing 1 is the torrc configuration file for one of our systems running a directory server.
The settings in the file are grouped into sections by the service to which they apply (client, relay,
dirserver, etc.). This listing shows an example of the configurations that must be made to Tor for it
to run in a standalone environment. The most important of which are:
• Enabling and configuring the V3 authoritative directory server (lines 56–75)
• Configuring Tor to use the private directory servers (lines 81–83)
• Enabling the TestingTorNetwork setting (line 87)
The TestingTorNetwork setting is actually an umbrella setting that configures a multitude
of individual settings. Some of the changes include: shortening the timing intervals for V3 directory
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voting processes, allowing Tor to accept non-publicly routable IP addresses, and making reachability
information available more quickly from the directories. Tor will not be able to operate on our
private network without these settings configured. The TestingTorNetwork option is available in
Tor versions 0.2.1.2-alpha and later [63].
A.3 Directory Server Keys
In Listing 1, when the private directory servers are enumerated, there are two fields that
must be filled with information from the user’s Tor instance.
The field for “FINGERPRINT” can be determined by inspecting the output of the com-
mand tor --list-fingerprint for the fingerprint. Each relay on the network must have a unique
fingerprint, so it is important not to copy the contents of Tor’s data directory from one system to
another when installing the systems.
The field for “V3IDENTKEY” can be found once the identity and signing keys have been
generated for the authority. To generate them, change to Tor’s keys directory and run the generate
new certificate command:
cd /var/lib/tor/keys
tor -gencert --create -identity -key
The authority certificate file that is generated by the command will contain the value for
the field near the top of the file in a line beginning with “fingerprint”. The character string after
the word “fingerprint” is what should replace “V3IDENTKEY” in the torrc file. Care should be
taken not to confuse the two different fingerprints.
The keys generated by the command expire once a year. They can be renewed by simply
running the tor-gencert command from the keys directory again (but this time without the create
flag). The identity fingerprints should remain the same.
It is important to note that one of the key files generated by the command should be kept
secret, authority identity key. If it is leaked or stolen, an adversary could create a mimic of the
directory server and our relays would trust it. This is less of a risk on a private experimental
network, but it is still recommended that the file be moved to a more secure location. If this is done,
it needs to be moved back when the keys are renewed, otherwise the fingerprint will be regenerated.
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A.4 System Clocks
Another thing that must be done when constructing a private Tor network is to maintain
the clocks on each system in the network. We use the network time protocol [64] to keep all test
systems’ clocks at close to the same time. This is needed because a Tor client will not build a circuit
with a relay if the system clocks are off by “more than a few hours” [65].
A.5 Summary
Detailed information has been provided about the configuration of our private Tor network
used in our experiments. Once Tor has been installed on a system, the configuration file listed in
Section A.2 can be used to replicate one of our directory servers. Additional directory servers can
be created from the same file by simply modifying lines 36 and 39. The file can also be adjusted to
create Tor nodes that are just relays by removing the authoritative directory section.
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